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In 1992, Greenpeace Germany obtained orders for 70,000 alternative refrigerators that do not use greenhouse gasses, encouraging manufacturers to bring this product to market. 3 In the late 1990s, Greenpeace Netherlands collected the names of 15,000 people who were willing to buy solar photovoltaic (PV) modules in its campaign to promote the solar power industry. In Spain, environmental activists have toured the country with a solar-powered caravan to demonstrate that solar electricity works. In 2001,
Greenpeace partnered with the European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA) to produce a report that forecast the long-term future of solar energy; this report received a great deal of attention in industry circles and led to additional reports by the two organizations in the years that followed. 4 As these examples illustrate, social movement organizations (SMOs), defined as -organizations which identify their goals with the preferences of a social movement and attempt to implement those goals‖ Zald 1977: 1218) , can be prominent supporters of industries that they consider more acceptable alternatives to dominant industries. We address two questions that emerge in relation to these scenarios:
How does SMOs' prominence within an industry influence firms' strategic commitment, and why do firms differ in their responses to such SMO prominence?
Prior literature on social movements and organizations investigates the support that SMOs provide and their role in industry creation and expansion. For example, SMOs have influenced entrepreneurial activity in the wind power sector (Sine and Lee 2009; Pacheco, York, and Hargrave 2014) , the development of the green building industry (York and Lenox 2014) , and the creation of markets for local goods (Kurkland and McKaffrey 2016) . However, because research in this area mainly focuses on the industry as the primary level of analysis, it has been ill-positioned to address heterogeneity in the strategic choices of firms operating in these industries. This omission is problematic on at least two accounts. First, few studies of industries supported by SMOs have moved beyond entrepreneurial entry rates, leaving firms' subsequent decisions to commit strategically to such industries unexplored. This gap raises the question of whether (some) firms enter industries merely to comply symbolically with social 4 industry, its positive effect on investments gets attenuated among firms that have experienced recent antagonistic relationships with activists.
These findings have important implications for studies of the interaction of social movements and organizations, as well as for strategy research. First, SMO prominence encourages firms' commitment to the industry on average, but some firms react negatively to SMOs' involvement, which limits their subsequent commitment. Thus, the findings of this study add an important refinement to knowledge of the relationship between firms and SMOs. By focusing on firm-level strategies instead of industry-level outcomes (Sine and Lee 2009; Hiatt et al. 2009; York and Lenox 2014; Pacheco et al. 2014) , we complement past research and help explain how SMO prominence can enlarge heterogeneity within an organizational field. Second, our measure of how much firms commit to the solar PV industry suggests that SMO prominence prompts firms to act in ways that go beyond symbolic adherence to movement expectations or impression management (Fiss and Zajac 2006; McDonnel and King 2013) . The resulting increases in investments appear substantive; a one standard deviation in SMO prominence leads to a yearly increase in commitment by 22% over a firm's average production during this period. Third, this average effect differs substantially and may reverse, depending on the firm's characteristics, so our results contribute to strategic management research by showing that within-industry variation in investment strategies stems from the conjunction of SMO prominence at the industry level and idiosyncratic organizational attributes at the firm level.
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, FIRMS, AND INDUSTRY CREATION
Two streams of literature serve as points of departure for this study. The first investigates the impact of activists and SMOs on firms, either directly or indirectly. Studies in this area examine the effects of shareholder activism, boycotts, lawsuits, protests, and threats of government regulation (Bartley and Child 2011; Davis and Thompson 1994; King and Soule 2007; Reid and Toffel 2009; Walker et al. 2008; Yue et al. 2013; Aranda and Simons, 2017) and show that, despite their relative lack of resources and formal control over firms, and without necessarily seeking the state as a mediator (King, 2008) , social movements often can effectively trigger organizational change. These studies mostly investigate cases in 5 which activists target firms to drive them away from contested corporate practices. Firms then respond to these appeals in an effort to avoid increasing operating costs, negative media coverage, or reputation
damage. Yet these effects are contingent on organizational characteristics, such that some firms respond differently than others (King 2008; Hiatt, Grandy, and Lee 2015; Waldron, Navis, and Fisher 2013) .
A second stream of research takes a perspective in which SMOs are not necessarily contentious.
Rather, SMOs can influence the emergence of new industries and help create market spaces for business practices with greater social value than existing technologies. Studies on the grass-fed meat and dairy market (Weber et al. 2008) , the wind energy sector (Sine and Lee, 2009; Pacheco et al. 2014) , the forestry industry (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010) , or sustainable tourism (Van Wijk et al., 2013) describe mechanisms by which SMOs operate as institutional entrepreneurs and how they form alternative industry practices and frames to promote them. These studies, focusing at the industry or field level of analysis, have offered complementary evidence to suggest that SMOs can foster the creation of new markets by shaping the boundaries around experimental spaces that ‗protect' alternative industry practices.
Moreover, SMOs can be influential in shaping public attention (Andrews and Caren 2010; Vasi and King 2012) , because they are -actively engaged in a social constructionist process as framing agents‖ (Snow and Benford 2009: 38) in their efforts to influence public discourse and sentiments. Framing refers to -the signifying work or meaning construction engaged in by movement adherents … relevant to the interests of movements‖ (Snow 2006 (Snow : 1780 . By using framing techniques, SMOs diagnose and highlight the problems associated with disputed business practices (Hiatt et al. 2009; Weber et al. 2009; Berrone et al. 2016) , as well as promulgate solutions that materialize as alternative technologies in line with the activists' values and identities (Sine and Lee 2009; Vasi 2011; Weber et al. 2008) . Activists and SMOs frame these solutions as -necessary, valid and appropriate‖ (Rao 1998: 912) , which contributes to the legitimation of these practices and to greater confidence in their potential.
For example, in the European solar PV industry, environmental SMOs sponsored a series of actions, as illustrated in the opening of this paper and in Table 1 . Environmental SMOs promote energysaving or non-depleting technologies and legitimize these technologies by mobilizing advocate coalitions (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006) , engaging consultants to write impact reports, coordinating policy papers (Koopmans 1999) , educating the public (Hiatt et al. 2009; Sine and Lee 2009) , linking consumers to producers (Weber et al. 2008) , and articulating the technologies' benefits in the mass media. Such actions increase acceptance of the industry and confer legitimacy on industry participants (David et al., 2013 ).
---Insert Table 1 about here ---However, despite the significant body of research on markets supported by movements, most work in this area has relied on the industry level, preventing in-depth insights into how SMOs' support for new markets variously affects the strategic commitment of producers that serve those markets (Pacheco and Dean 2015) . In this paper, we define SMO prominence as the attention given by the industry to an SMO and accordingly investigate whether an increase in SMO prominence leads producers to increase their commitment to the industry. By commitment, we refer to concrete investments in production, not symbolic claims or mere presence in an industry. Just as prominent firms draw more attention and reactions from stakeholders (Mishina et al 2010) , prominent SMOs should prompt stronger reactions from firms. In terms of the nature of these reactions, SMO prominence could imply heightened politicization of an industry, which may reduce firms' investments (Ingram, Yue, and Rao 2010) and lead them to decouple their actions (Crilly, Zollo and Hansen 2012) , such that they make only superficial investments in socially desirable industries (Philippe and Durand 2011) . But several other reasons suggest that SMO prominence may enhance firm commitment to the supported industry on average.
First, greater SMO prominence implies that the alternative technologies promoted by the SMOs offer industry solutions that are consistent with public preferences, which entices firms to increase their commitment in anticipation of favorable consumption trends in the more broadly supported industry (York and Lenox 2014) . Second, the prominence of SMOs suggests that the favorable cues they provide are more meaningful and accepted, enabling and justifying investments in these activities. That is, SMOs' optimistic framing is more likely to reach producers, thereby offering evidence to justify firms' investments in the industry to shareholders or other stakeholders that may doubt their value (Weber and Soderstrom 2011) . Third, SMO prominence indicates that links and associations with activists get taken 7 into account by industry, resulting in potential reputational benefits from investing in it (Philippe and Durand 2011) . As SMOs become prominent, firms are motivated to invest in the alternative practices and show that they not only understand the concerns of social movements but also help remedy them. As we discuss subsequently, these three drivers suggest different implications for different firms, but they all point in the same direction: Ceteris paribus, SMO prominence relates positively to a firm's propensity to increase its commitment to the industry sponsored by that SMO.
H1:
The more prominent an SMO is within an industry it supports, the more producers increase their commitment to this industry.
This baseline hypothesis establishes a main relationship, based on three mechanisms: sponsorship aligned with local preferences, diffusion of positive information cues about the industry's potential, and reputational benefits. Each producer is more or less likely to be responsive to each of these mechanisms, depending on its characteristics. Notably, a firm's location, its sensitivity to informational cues about the industry, and its history of associations with activists likely influence its reflection of SMO prominence as a positive or negative signal and thus its decision to commit substantial resources to the industry.
For example, though many issues addressed by social movements transcend national boundaries, substantial differences exist across nations in their support for each movement (Koopmans 2009; Marks and McAdam 2009 ). In the case of the environment movement, these cross-national differences are so striking that they led Rootes (2007: 632) to argue that speaking about -the‖ global environmental movement is -a triumph of abstraction or of aspiration over experience.‖ Therefore, firm location should strongly influence whether the main effect expressed by H1 can be amplified. If a firm is located in a country where SMOs garner strong support, it should be more inclined to consider SMO prominence as an indication of local public preferences and adjust its investments accordingly. Firms often consider SMO support as a signal of social preferences for new sectors-such as organic food, non-fossil energy, or fair trade coffee-that indicates potential demand for new production practices (Hiatt et al. 2009; Vasi 2009; Reinecke and Ansari 2013) . One industry expert we interviewed suggested that environmental organizations -reflect the concerns of the citizens and consumers‖ and that companies integrate these 8 concerns into their strategies. Location in a country where SMO support is high also provides the firm with ‗social proof' (Rao et al 2001) that local social preferences are aligned with the SMO and that the SMO can mobilize further resources for sustained campaigns that support the industry in a given area (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Vasi and King 2014) . As such, a firm will be more likely to view SMO prominence positively when it is located in a country where the SMO receives stronger local support, which should result in its greater commitment to the industry. (Snow 2006) , SMOs modify the cues available to decision makers and alter perceptions of industry opportunities (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001) . That is, SMOs tend to be selective in their discourse and employ optimistic rhetoric (Gamson and Meyer 1996) about the economic potential of new technologies, such as praising -green champions‖ while ignoring or condemning -brown‖ firms. They also prefer to publicize forecasts that paint a rosy picture of their favored industries' potential (see Table 1 for an example).
H2:
However, not all firms are equally responsive to external stakeholders' discourse or likely to accept it as a credible representation of the industry's potential (Rao et al. 2001; Schifeling 2013; Durand and Jacqueminet 2015) . Rather, the informational cues propagated by activists differentially affect firms, depending on the stance they have adopted toward the industry in the past. Evidence from psychology and behavioral economics suggests that individuals and organizations rely excessively on signals that confirm their beliefs, expectations, or current reference points (Nickerson 1998; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; McNamara and Bromiley 1997; Durand 2003; Elfenbeit and Knott 2015) . A firm that already has engaged in substantial investments in the new industry thus may be more sensitive to SMO prominence than a 9 rival that has not made any such investments. Compared with competitors with fewer stakes in the industry, firms with larger prior commitments to solar PV should rely more on signals that support the industry's potential, reinforcing the effect of SMO prominence on their production investments. The SMO's prominence and associated cues about the industry's potential confirm the firm's choices and encourage its pursuit of continued investment (for evidence of such a confirmation effect in a high-tech market, see Henderson and Stern, 2004 ; for an example of optimistic cues in the solar PV context, see Table 1 ). Within organizations, greater SMO prominence reinforces managers' attention toward the industry, which may lead to new investments in production (Delmas and Toffel 2008; Ocasio 1997; Georgallis 2017 (Bowen, 2014: 2) .
More generally, companies frequently attacked by a social movement develop a tainted image that prompts accusations of greenwashing or duplicity (Lyon and Montogomery 2015) , which may make them wary of activists' prominence in the industry (Carlos and Lewis 2017) . The involvement of SMOs in the industry increases these firms' risk of being scrutinized, which lowers their motivation to invest more because they cannot reap the reputational benefits of such investments (Barnett, 2007) . Indeed, publicly communicating their investments carries greater risk for these firms, compared with firms that have good or neutral relationships with activists. Thus, the main effect of SMO prominence on a firm's commitment to an industry is likely moderated by the prior relationship between the focal firm and the social movement: SMO prominence will shape firms' risk assessments and result in lower subsequent commitments when the firms have been targeted more by the social movement in the past. Formally:
H4: The effect of SMO prominence on a firm's increased commitment is less pronounced for firms that have historically adversarial relationships with the focal social movement.

SETTING, DATA, AND VARIABLES
We test these predictions in the European solar PV production industry by using a unique data set of solar cell producers operating in European Union (EU) countries during the 1990-2011 period. Several criteria guided our choice of setting. First, the solar PV industry has grown into a very important sector of economic activity. In 2011, this US$80 billion industry 5 became the first renewable technology to surpass conventional energy technologies in terms of newly installed capacity in the EU. 6 Second, it is important that the focal industry be of interest to a social movement. Anecdotal evidence reveals that environmental SMOs have championed solar energy and promoted PV technology, despite cost disadvantages, for many years (Jacobsson et al. 2004; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006) . The socio-environmental benefits linked to the use of solar energy (EPIA 2008; EPIA and Greenpeace 2001; Flamos et al. 2009 ) make solar PV one of the most favored industries by environmental activists. Third, SMOs' activities must attract the attention of industry participants, which can be captured through the specialized business press devoted to this industry. For example, many industry publications cite environmental organizations-not to report their confrontational activities but to discuss tactics for promoting the PV industry. Thus, the European solar PV cells industry provides an appropriate setting to test our hypotheses.
Data
We drew our population of firms from PV News, the world's oldest solar PV industry newsletter and, according to industry experts, a highly reliable source of information on solar cell production activity worldwide that offers the longest coverage available (Kapoor and Furr 2015) . Data availability encouraged us to focus on solar cell producers: One of the most capital-intensive stages in the solar PV value chain, solar cell production is a multibillion dollar sector. Although relatively few firms were active in the field, this setting provides the benefit of reducing the chances that firms enter the industry for merely symbolic reasons. The upstream part of the PV value chain is characterized by very high Minimum Efficiency Scales and thus high costs of operating solar PV cell production facilities, which offers two benefits: First, these circumstances offer a conservative test of our hypotheses (i.e., we test whether an SMO is able to influence the growth of companies in a setting where the stakes are high).
Second, it can separate out the effect of the movement from the effect of the firms, which would not be 5 See www.pvgroup.org/sites/pvgroup.org/files/docs/SEMI-PVGrp_WhPpr_MnfctrngSlrPV.pdf.
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entirely possible in downstream parts of the value chain (e.g. solar power generation) where environmentalists may also be firm founders because of the relatively low barriers to entry.
Although PV News started to issue annual lists of solar cell producers before 1990, we used this year as the beginning of our observation period because environmental organizations started actively promoting the industry around 1990. We sampled firms that operated between 1990 and 2011 in the EU (in particular, the 12 countries that were EU members from the beginning of our observation period) to ensure homogeneity in the transnational environment while retaining cross-country differences in SMO support (as discussed subsequently). Eight of these countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) had solar PV cell producers reported in PV News' annual lists of solar cell manufacturers. Our dataset includes all producers reported by PV News as operating in these countries. The number of solar PV ventures per country ranges in our sample from 1 (Denmark) to 24 (Germany), with an average of 6.4 and a median of 3.5 producers per country. The final data set is an unbalanced panel of 315 observations, corresponding to 51 firm-country dyads that remained in the sample for an average of 6.17 years and operated in 8 countries during the observation period.
Dependent variable: production expansion
To proxy for increased firm commitment, we first coded firms' annual production of solar PV cells in megawatts (MW) in each country, as listed in the PV News archive. To verify the reliability of this production information, we consulted industry professionals and interviewed the current and former (founding) editor of PV News. We also cross-checked the data against a survey by another industry journal, Photon International, for a randomly chosen year (2001) . Virtually all firms' reported production figures were similar in both industry magazines. We used a growth model to estimate increased firm commitment to solar PV. Per this approach, the dependent variable is a firm's production in country c and year t expressed in MW. Note that a lagged dependent variable (i.e., firm's production in country c and year t -1) is included in the regressors; other model characteristics are outlined in the next section.
Independent variables
Following interviews with industry insiders and reviews of archival material, we chose to study
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Greenpeace as the SMO of interest. Despite being widely depicted as a radical activist group, Greenpeace employs a wide range of tactics to promote alternative industries as solutions to environmental problems.
It has maintained steady, comparatively high membership rates in Europe for the past two decades and remains the most prominent supporter of solar energy among Europe's nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The organization has set the transformation of the energy field-or the -Energy [R]evolution‖ (Greenpeace 2014)-as one of its top priorities. In 1994, Greenpeace began a dedicated solar energy campaign, followed by many subsequent campaigns to promote solar energy that involved leafleting, conference presentations, scientific reports, radio broadcasting, and even installations of PV panels (see Table 1 for illustrations). In addition, Greenpeace receives attention from the industry itself and, to foreshadow our results, in a consequential manner.
We rely on industry press coverage to capture SMO prominence (focusing on Greenpeace), because these sources offer specialized coverage of the industry and act as historical records that simultaneously structure and reflect the attention of their readers (Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001 ). We use all monthly issues of PV News that were available from the beginning of our observation period, complemented with the full archive of Photon International. These sources constitute the two most comprehensive solar PV industry trade journals (Kapoor and Furr 2015) . The attention that
Greenpeace received from the industry press varied over our period of observation, signaling distinct levels of prominence attributed to this SMO within the solar PV industry. The proportion of issues mentioning an actor serves as a good proxy for the prominence of this actor, by reflecting industry-level attention, or the selective focus of attention that industry participants pay to a particular actor, situation, or event (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001 ). Our first independent variable, Greenpeace prominence, is the number of publication issues in each year that mention Greenpeace, divided by the total number of issues published that year.
Our second hypothesis requires a proxy for the strength of environmental movement support in a given country. For this variable, we followed prior research, which relies on patterns of membership in prominent environmental organizations (Hiatt et al. 2009; Lee and Sine 2007; Sine and Lee 2009; Schneiberg, King and Smith 2008) , and used cross-country data on Greenpeace members from three sources to construct our measure. One of the authors gained access to the Greenpeace International archive of the International Institute of Social History, located in Amsterdam, where he gathered and coded information about the number of paying Greenpeace members across countries and years. These data were incomplete, so we combined them with data on Greenpeace supporters that were published in a study of the ratification of the Kyoto protocol (Von Stein 2008) . Because the exact sources cited in this study could not be traced, we were cautious about the reliability of this data set and therefore compared the data for the countries and years for which information was available from both sources; this correlation exceeded 99%. We combined these sources with data from annual reports issued by
Greenpeace national branches to construct the variable Greenpeace local support, proxied by the number of paying Greenpeace members in a country per year. A few values were still missing after this procedure, which we imputed using linear interpolation (Sine and Lee 2009; York and Lenox 2014) .
According to our third hypothesis, one mechanism by which SMO prominence affects firms is its reflection of activists' ability to disseminate positive cues about the industry as a viable investment opportunity. These cues are more convincing, and firms are more likely to notice, when the producer has already made substantial investments in the industry. We used three different variables to test whether firms' prior investment behavior makes them more or less sensitive to SMO prominence. First, we captured a firm's past commitment relative to competitors, by taking its share of production over total European PV production for that year (reported by PV News). Second, we used a firm's prior production as a proxy for its absolute commitment to the industry. Third, we created a variable that accounts for firms' cumulative commitments over time (for all years since the firm's entry in PV), with a decay factor to acknowledge the greater importance of more recent investments. To test H3, we created an interaction for each of these three variables with Greenpeace prominence. Because the magnitude of production share is easier to interpret, we report the results using this first variable, but the hypothesized effect is consistent across all three operationalizations.
Finally, to test our fourth hypothesis, we need to gauge the differences in firms' relationships 15 with environmental activists and NGOs. We gathered data from media reports using the LexisNexis Academic Database. Following prior literature (e.g. Lenox and Eesley 2009; King 2008; Vasi and King 2012) , we coded the number of instances in which firms appear to be targeted by environmental activists or groups through protests, boycotts, demonstrations, or lawsuits (the search string and details of the coding procedure are included in the Appendix A, together with a description of the procedure we used to eliminate false positives). Because a pilot study revealed that including only English-language news items severely limited the resulting articles, we hired research assistants to translate the keywords and repeat the searches in other languages. The overall search thus included six languages: English, Spanish, French, German, Dutch, and Italian. Our final measure of the variable Adversarial relationship at time t is the number of articles that indicate an adversarial relationship between the focal firm and environmental groups over the previous three years [t -3, t -1] . Because the variable was highly skewed, we transformed it to its natural logarithm (after adding 1); the transformed variable is included in the models.
We created an interaction for this variable with Greenpeace prominence to test the last hypothesis.
Control variables
Our model also includes several producer characteristics, country-level variables, and market characteristics. As discussed previously, because we use a growth model (cf. Stuart, 2000) to estimate increased commitment to the industry, a lagged dependent variable is included as past production in the focal country affects future production. We also control for producers' Tenure in the industry, measured as the cumulative number of years that the firm has actively produced solar PV cells in each country, which may influence its propensity or ability to expand. To account for potential competitive effects or expansion bandwagons, which have been shown to affect firm responses to social movements (Briscoe, Gupta, and Anner, 2015; Pacheco and Dean 2015) , we control for total Rivals' expansion in the same country. In models that include the Adversarial relationship variable, we control for the total number (logged) of media reports mentioning the firm during the same period, after excluding those that imply an adversarial relationship (so that they are not double-counted). We also add the variable Foreign firm to gauge the propensity of producers to grow more or less when operating outside of their headquartered country (which could also be correlated with their sensitivity to local SMOs).
In terms of country characteristics, we control for Electricity prices, because demand for renewables tends to be greater when electricity prices are higher, and environmental movement activists may find it easier to promote renewable energy in these countries. Data on each country's electricity prices were collected from Eurostat and the International Energy Agency. Moreover, public policies likely shape firms' commitment to an industry. The most influential and widely used mechanism to promote solar PV in Europe has been the feed-in-tariff (FiT) scheme (Flamos et al. 2009; Hoppmann et al. 2013; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006) , whereby governments promise to purchase electricity produced through renewable energy at a premium rate, or tariff, for a set number of years. Feed-in-tariff is the average tariff duration offered by each country's FiT scheme in each year, and accounts for the effect of the policy environment (Georgallis and Durand 2017) ; using the tariff price, we obtained virtually identical results. In addition, our model includes country fixed effects, which control for unobserved differences between countries that are not captured by these variables.
Industry growth can exert a positive impact on commitment (Gilbert and Lieberman 1987; Henderson and Cool 2003) and also provide a framing tool that helps social movements draw attention to solar PV as a viable opportunity. Following prior research (Henderson and Cool 2003; Pacheco-deAlmeida et al. 2008) , we use the four-year historical compound annual rate of production growth (CAGR) in the EU as a proxy for Industry growth. Greater uncertainty about the industry's growth could deter companies' expansion plans, so we created a Growth uncertainty variable, using the standard deviation of the four-year CAGR in industry growth.
MODELS AND RESULTS
To test the hypotheses, we use a growth model with production as the dependent variable and a lagged dependent variable included to account for firms' prior production. The nature of our data further guided our econometric specification. The results of a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test rejected the null hypothesis of constant variance (p < .01), indicating the presence of heteroskedasticity, and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data suggested the presence of serial correlation (p < .05).
Because we have repeat observations of the same entity across multiple years, residuals are likely correlated across these two dimensions. We thus employ an extension of the ordinary least squares (OLS) model (Thompson 2011 ) that provides standard errors that are robust to autocorrelated (1) within-panel disturbances -i.e., clustering on entity and (2) across-panel disturbances -i.e., clustering on time, combined with traditional heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. This model thus accounts for simultaneous variation across time and firms; Thompson (2011) advocates it as particularly appropriate for small samples and when regressors include significant time and firm components, such as in our case.
To ensure that Greenpeace prominence and firm growth are not two separately co-occurring phenomena,
we also add period effects to reflect changes in EU leadership. 7 Finally, we include country fixed effects (for countries with more than one producer-that is, all of them but Denmark) to account for unobserved country differences that could drive firms' commitment to the industry, such as the mere size of the country. Because temporal precedence is a primary requirement for testing causality, we measure our dependent variable one year after the predictor variables. Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for all variables. Some variable pairs exhibit relatively high absolute correlations, so we standardize the continuous predictor variables before running the models to remove nonessential collinearity (Aiken and West 1991; Dalal and Zickar 2012) . Further, variance inflation factor analyses confirmed that multicollinearity does not pose a threat the study's conclusions. Table 3 contains the results of the growth model. In Model 1, we regress production on the control variables. As expected, prior commitment is a very strong predictor of current commitment, according to the significant and positive coefficient of lagged production. Accounting for prior commitment, electricity prices are a strong predictor of a firm's expansion of solar PV production. That 7 We created (four) dummy variables that capture the timing of (three) changes in the presidency of the European
---Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here ---
Commission. In unreported tests, we experimented with other ways to account for macroscopic changes over time, such as using a linear time trend variable or including period effects that reflected EU directives for the promotion of electricity. The results remained consistent across all these analyses.
is, in countries with high electricity prices, solar producers tend to increase their production more, viewing solar PV production as a growth opportunity. Foreign producers tend to expand less compared to local producers, as indicated by the marginally significant coefficient of Foreign firm. Surprisingly, our proxy for the regulatory environment, Feed-in-tariff, does not conform to our predictions, in that its coefficient is far from significant and even is negative in some models. We suspected that the effect of FiTs could be absorbed by the period dummies or the variables that capture industry growth and uncertainty, which depend strongly on the policy conditions (Georgallis and Durand 2017) . 8 Indeed, in additional tests, we find that the FiT coefficient is positive and significant when we exclude these variables. Finally, the coefficient of industry uncertainty is negative and significant, as expected.
When we add Greenpeace prominence in Model 2, its coefficient is positive and significant, in support of H1. Greater prominence of Greenpeace in the industry is associated with solar PV manufacturers' greater production increases. Based on Model 2, we can calculate the substantial influence of this effect, which has a range of approximately 21.5 MW from the lowest (when industry press did not report any Greenpeace actions) to the highest (when half the industry press issues mentioned Greenpeace)
values of this variable. To put this in perspective, consider that mean production in our sample over the whole period was approximately 36 MW. Another way to gauge the size of this effect is to note that a one standard deviation increase in Greenpeace prominence leads to an approximately 8 MW increase in production, or a 22% increase [100  (36 + 8)/36 -100] over the baseline for the average producer during this period.
We also have postulated that the impact of this effect would be stronger for firms located in countries with stronger support for the environmental movement. We add Greenpeace local support and its interaction with the main effect in Model 3. The coefficient of the interaction is significant, in support of H2. Based on Model 3, we see that a one standard deviation increase in Greenpeace local support increases, on average and ceteris paribus, the effect of Greenpeace prominence by 3.6 MW, or 19 approximately 51% [100  (7.1 + 3.6)/7.1 -100] over the effect of Greenpeace prominence when Greenpeace local support is at its mean.
For H3, we examine whether our main effect varies depending on the past commitment of the producer in the industry. We add the interaction of Greenpeace prominence with past commitment in Model 4. The interaction coefficient is positive and significant, consistent with H3. Again, we can gauge the economic significance of the effect: a one standard deviation increase in past commitment increases, on average and ceteris paribus, the effect of Greenpeace prominence by 5.4 MW, or approximately 73%
[100  (7.3 + 5.4)/7.3 -100] over the effect of Greenpeace prominence when past commitment is at its mean.
To test H4, we include the variable Adversarial relationship and its interaction with Greenpeace prominence in Model 5. This variable captures the number of articles that indicate an adversarial
relationship between the firm and environmental activists over the previous three years. We thus add another control for the total number of articles that mention the firm over the same period (minus those that indicate an adversarial relationship, to avoid double-counting). As Model 5 shows, the effect of Greenpeace prominence on firms' expansion is lower for firms that have been targeted more in recent years, compared with those that were not frequent targets of activism, as indicated by the negative, significant interaction term in Model 5. A one standard deviation increase in this variable decreases, on average and ceteris paribus, the effect of Greenpeace prominence by 1.8 MW, or approximately 22%
[100  (8.3 -1.8)/8.3 -100], compared with the effect of Greenpeace prominence when the adversarial relationship variable is at its mean.
Model 6 presents all hypothesized effects together, thereby further corroborating these conclusions. Figure B1 in Appendix B depicts the impact of the main effect on PV production expansion for different values of Greenpeace local support and graphically confirms H2. Figure B2 reveals the impact of Greenpeace prominence on PV production expansion for different values of past commitments; the slope is steeper when the firm has committed more to the industry. As Figure B3 shows, the effect of Greenpeace prominence is significant and has a downward slope for all values of the Adversarial relationship variable around the mean. In unreported analyses, we find that the effect becomes insignificant (confidence interval includes 0) only for very high values of this variable, which are marginally within the range of our data.
All together, the additional predicted effect of a situation in which all moderating variables favor expansion (values at mean + 1 SD for both Greenpeace local support and Past commitments, and at mean -1 SD for Adversarial relationship) is +19.4 MW (a substantial increase, considering that the average production in our period of observation was 36 MW). A situation with unfavorable conditions instead is associated with a production decrease of approximately 5.2 MW (see Table 4 ).
---Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here ---
Robustness tests
We ran further tests (see Table 5 ) to establish the validity of the results and affirm that the moderators for which we found evidence appropriately capture the theoretical mechanisms.
First, with regard to H2, local support for Greenpeace could be confounded empirically with the characteristics of a citizenry that holds pro-environmental values. Thus, a valid concern is that firms' choices may be driven by unobserved underlying values, which also increase membership in SMOs.
Therefore, we attempt to determine whether H2 can be attributed to SMO support or if it merely represents an outcome of the underlying norms or values that prevail in a specific country. Using data , we used the following predictors: country population, degree of urbanization, GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (proxy for affluence), the country's unemployment rate, the percentage of women in the labor force, the percentage of people enrolled in tertiary education, the country's per capita CO 2 emissions (inverse proxy for environmental quality), the percentage of people with access to the Internet (to tap access to information about global environmental problems), and the seats of parties to the center and left as a
Greenpeace local support, in Model 6. The result (prediction) should capture the extent to which
Greenpeace support is a reflection of the underlying values of the citizenry, and the residual reflects the -portion‖ of Greenpeace membership that is unexplained by public sentiment. Thus, the effect of the residual on firm commitment accounts for SMO impact over and above the unobserved environmental values of the citizenry. Model 7 suggests that the interaction discussed in H2 is slightly subdued but remains significant when we take into account the underlying values of the citizenry. The prediction of the regression on Greenpeace membership has a positive but not significant interaction, while the residual has a positive and significant interaction. This means that the SMO has an effect over and above the role of values. These results are consistent with the idea that, while public values are strong predictors of membership, the presence of SMO members that give voice to those values is a stronger signal for industry players, as it indicates the capacity of the movement to garner support for the industry and affect the behavior of firms in the focal country (cf. the disproportional influence of activist constituents on their political environment; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006) . Finally, the positive interaction between Greenpeace prominence and the residual of Greenpeace membership suggests that the much studied effect of SMO local support has a stronger influence on firms when the SMO is prominent within the industry.
Second, we assessed the plausibility of our theory for the second mechanism. In particular, to probe the second mechanism-that firms are differentially affected by SMO prominence depending on their sensitivity to positive cues about the industry-we applied another empirical strategy, this time at a higher level of analysis. The perceived attractiveness of the industry, which affects the firm's sensitivity to SMO cues, may depend not only on the stakes that a firm has in the industry due to its past commitment, but also on perceived -industry opportunity structures‖ (Schurman 2004; Soule 2009 ) in the country. When symbolic claims (SMOs' rhetoric) are reinforced by material evidence (economic opportunities), those claims are more likely to be seen as true. Prior work has suggested that increases in electricity prices function as evidence of economic opportunities, such that they offer -institutional percentage of total cabinet posts (proxy for the political orientation of the citizenry). The regression yielded an adjusted R-square of .604 (details available on request).
entrepreneurs, such as environmental groups, … opportunities to promote new technological agendas‖ (see Sine & Lee, 2009: 126 ; also see -avoided costs‖ in Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert, 2005: 218) .
Therefore, we proxy for the industry's attractiveness at the country level by using changes in electricity prices (yearly changes in cents per KWh). We then interact this variable with Greenpeace prominence, with the expectation that SMO prominence would have a stronger effect for firms located in countries with greater electricity price increases. The results (Model 8) are consistent with this prediction, in further support of the mechanism driving H3. In a similar vein, we tried to infer this mechanism by interacting Greenpeace prominence with perceived economic opportunities at the industry level, by interacting it with one of our control variables that could indicate favorable industry opportunities, Industry growth;
again, we find supportive evidence (Model 9). Considered together with the main tests for H3, this evidence further corroborates the proposed theoretical mechanism.
Third, two characteristics of the Adversarial relationship variable led us to conduct further tests to examine the robustness of the reported effect. First, more than two-thirds of the firms in our sample were never targeted by environmental activists, so most of the variation in this variable was driven by the relatively small number of firms with non-zero values. We thus rerun the test with a simpler variable: a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm was targeted at least once in the previous three years, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with our previous results, the interaction of this dummy variable with Greenpeace prominence is negative and significant (Model 10). Second, firms that had been the targets of activists were almost exclusively de alio entrants, firms that diversified into solar PV from other industries (only one de novo entrant received negative media mentions). Therefore, we reestimated the model, this time using a subsample of only de alio firms. Despite the considerable reduction in sample size, the results for the interaction effect point to the same conclusions (Model 11). We also considered the possibility that this last moderating variable could be endogenous and estimated instrumental variable (IV) models to address this concern. When using IV models we find no differences in the hypothesized effect; what is more, our post-estimation tests suggested that our measure of activist scrutiny is not endogenous to PV firms' expansion, so we do not report these results. Overall, we find strong evidence that the impact of Greenpeace prominence is less pronounced for firms that have an adversarial relationship with activists.
Additional robustness tests are presented in Appendix B. Because of the sample size, we were concerned if outliers could exert excessive influence on the results and drive our conclusions. To ensure no such influence, we excluded observations for which the dependent variable had values greater (lower) than the mean, plus (minus) 3.5 standard deviations. We then reestimated the full set of models with the remaining observations and found that the results were virtually unchanged (Appendix B: Model 12).
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the assumptions of the estimator, in additional robustness tests we estimated production with two different models. We first fit a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model to the data set. This population average method, which is appropriate for data in which repeated measures are correlated within-subjects (Ballinger 2004), allows for non-normally distributed dependent variables and indirectly accounts for firm-level factors that might affect the dependent variable but are not included as controls. Analyzing our data using GEE with a first-order autoregressive correlation structure pointed to similar conclusions (Model 13). All hypothesized effects were significant, except the last interaction term (conditioning the main effect on firms' historical relationship with activists), which was qualitatively similar but fell short of significance. However, visual inspection of the marginal effects showed that it is significant at values of Adversarial relationship close to the mean and insignificant at high values (i.e., for firms that are the most frequent targets of activism), a result consistent with the main results from Table 3 .
In another set of tests, we estimated production using a model in which, instead of clustering at the producer level, we include fixed effects for all producers that were in the industry for at least 7 years [i.e., firms with above-average presence in our sample (the average was 6.2)]. Because these models include producer instead of country fixed effects, we exclude the variable Foreign firm, which is stable across each producer, and add new controls to account for relatively stable cross-country differences: the country's size (population), economic conditions (GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity), 24 and structure of the energy industry (concentration of the conventional energy sector). The analyses produced no substantive differences in the hypothesized effects (Model 14).
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Overall, the reported results are consistent across a variety of specifications that account for the presence of outliers, alternative ways of inferring the theoretical mechanisms, different estimators, and additional control variables.
Content analysis
As a final caution, we decided to zoom in on the content of the industry press articles that mention Greenpeace, for two related reasons. First, one of our underlying assumptions was that the main measure of SMO prominence reflects support for the solar PV industry. However, an SMO (Greenpeace, in this particular case) might be prominent in the industry not because of its support but for other reasons (e.g., because it attacks solar PV or because of its role in delegitimizing incumbent industries; see the first example in Table 1 ). Second, one of our findings was that the effect of SMO prominence on commitments to solar PV is reduced for firms that have had adversarial relations with activists. If SMO prominence does not reflect support for the PV industry, this interpretation would need to be revised.
Therefore, we decided to code the content of all industry press articles mentioning Greenpeace.
After content-coding all articles, we found that only about 2% of them indicate a negative stance by Greenpeace toward PV-typically for very specific issues, such as not recycling PV cells or the use of Cadmium Telluride (CsTe) in their production. Fewer than 8% of the articles mention Greenpeace's criticism or targeting of non-renewable energy. Most refer to legitimation or market support strategies (~37%) or information strategies (~52%) -see Table 1 for examples. 11 That is, about 89% of articles are 10 Aside from offering corroborative evidence, this analysis also confirms that the effect of firm location is not driven by endogeneity. For example, the results related to H2 could be due to firms' active choice to locate their production facilities in countries with higher SMO membership. Because location choice is a fixed characteristic of producers (i.e., they decide to locate once, then expand or not in that country), including fixed effects at the producer level (i.e., country-firm dyad) provides a means to control for this source of endogeneity. Endogeneity due other entry characteristics (e.g. timing or mode) is also accounted for, for the same reason.
associated with Greenpeace's supportive stance toward the industry, implying that our underlying assumption is well-founded. If we operationalize the variable that captures SMO prominence using only articles reflecting support for solar PV, the results of our analysis remain virtually intact (Model 15).
Mentions that indicate support for the PV industry are associated with production growth of approximately 6.5 MW, which corresponds to an 18% increase over current production for the average firm, similar to the effect reported in our main tests (see Table 3 ). The interaction effects also reflect differences similar to those reported in Table 3 . Thus, our results confirm that firms operating in this industry are differentially affected by an SMO that supports the industry.
DISCUSSION
Scholarship typically views social movement organizations and firms as opponents, but recent research notes how social movements can legitimize new sectors and create market opportunities for entrepreneurs, and that these opportunities vary with the regional strength of the SMOs that support the focal sector (Sine and Lee 2009; Hiatt et al. 2009; York and Lenox 2014; Pacheco et al. 2014 ). Yet the research emphasis placed by research on movement-supported markets on regional or industry-level effects has come at the expense of understanding intra-industry (inter-firm) variation (Pacheco and Dean 2015) . Relying on data from the European solar photovoltaic industry, we have demonstrated that
Greenpeace's prominence in the industry has strategic consequences for solar PV producers, which vary according to idiosyncratic firm attributes. Our analysis of solar PV cell manufacturers' expansions thus indicates the heterogeneous consequences that social movements generate within an industry. We find that SMO prominence is more consequential for firms located in countries with greater support for the focal movement organization and those whose extant commitments render them sensitive to cues that favor the industry's potential, but it is less influential for firms that have had an adversarial relationship in the past with environmental activists.
This article accordingly contributes to both the organizational literature on social movements and strategic management research. First, by revealing the influence of SMO prominence on solar PV firms, we extend recent investigations of the role of social movements as promoters of new practices (Weber et 26 al. 2008; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Van Wijk et al. 2013) , rather than as opponents of firms' behaviors (King 2008; Hiatt et al. 2015; Aranda and Simons 2017) . Our results suggest that the influence of SMOs on industry development is not limited to their impact on entrepreneurial entry or regulation. Rather, SMOs shape established firms' decisions, leading companies to commit more to emerging sectors. More importantly, our study contributes to the nascent but growing stream of research that studies variation in how firms are affected by social movements and activist groups that attack them (King 2008; McDonnell and King 2013; Waldron et al. 2013) . We extend this research by offering new evidence that firms are also not uniformly affected by SMOs that favor their activities. Thus, rather than driving all firms in the same direction, SMOs may enlarge the heterogeneity within an organizational field.
Second, one of our findings speaks to the double-edged sword that anti-corporate campaigns entail. Firms that have been targeted more by environmental activists are deterred by SMOs' involvement in an industry, perhaps because the activists' scrutiny leads them to perceive their investments as more risky. Activist targeting, which usually represents an effort to persuade firms to move away from irresponsible behavior, thus may have the unintended consequence of preventing firms from committing to alternative industries that offer greater social benefits. One could also consider that SMOs act as gatekeepers who intentionally attempt to keep contested, inauthentic, firms out of the industry (McInerney, 2014; Grodal, 2017) . We suggest that this is a less plausible explanation because, in this setting, contested companies were often criticized not for entering solar PV, but for not investing enough in the industry. Nevertheless, this mechanism is very likely to appear in market settings where the authenticity of producers is seen as more important than the mainstreaming of the market.
Third, prior studies suggest that activist groups can shape corporate outcomes, yet some of the organizational responses studied-such as public expressions of conformity (King 2008) Some recent work has started to alleviate this concern, by showing for example that boycotts can increase the number of corporate social initiatives adopted by firms (McDonnell and King 2013) or that protests can change oil companies' enhanced oil recovery practices (Hiatt, Grandy and Lee 2015) , which are more 27 costly responses and less likely to be merely symbolic. By demonstrating the link between SMO prominence and firms' production expansions, a variable that is central to firms' strategic considerations, we can confirm the impact of activists on important strategic decisions. What is more, their influence extends beyond inducing nascent entrepreneurial activity in settings with relatively low barriers to entry, such as independent wind power generation (Sine and Lee 2009) , to inflicting change in a manufacturing industry where the stakes are higher. We thus provide strong evidence that social movement actions can exert substantive impacts on firms' strategies.
Fourth, this study complements research on expansion decisions by placing firms' social contexts squarely in the center of attention. The strategies that firms adopt are partly molded by their national contexts (Rivera 2010 ), yet most studies of expansion decisions focus on firm characteristics and competitive effects (e.g., Henderson and Cool 2003; Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. 2008) . To the best of our knowledge, only one study has linked firms' expansion decisions to SMOs that favor the sector (Pacheco and Dean 2015) , emphasizing how firm responses to social movement expectations depend on the behavior of competitors. We build on this research and show that firm expansion results from a complex set of interactions between SMO prominence and the firm's characteristics. As such, our study points to the broader need to study organizational attributes together with a firm's non-market environment to understand and potentially predict expansion decisions.
Empirically, our study advances prior literature in two ways. First, research on social movements and markets has been very U.S.-centric (see Van Wijk et al 2013 for a notable exception). We help address this issue and respond to a call by King and Soule (2007) for more research on activist influence across various contexts by examining SMOs' impact on firms that operate in a different geographical area and across countries. Our findings corroborate the need for cross-country analysis (Pilati 2013) by showing that cross-country heterogeneity conditions the impact of SMO prominence, offering meaningful insight into differences in the behaviors of business organizations. Second, SMO membership in a jurisdictional unit is a commonly used indicator of social movement support for an industry, but it is also one that cannot point directly to their causal impact. It is difficult to determine whether membership 28 affects corporate change or is simply a reflection of the underlying norms of the citizenry. First, using data from industry press--a valid reflection of the cues to which the industry pays attention (Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001 )-this study shows that the more prominent an SMO is, the more firms enhance their commitments to the industry. Second, we examine the impact of SMO support ( A limitation of several studies in this area is their focus on a particular SMO, and our study is not immune to this concern. Sine and Lee (2009) chose the Sierra Club as the most relevant SMO; Hiatt et al. (2009) chose the Women's Temperance Union; we focus on Greenpeace. These choices were made on empirical grounds: through deep involvement in and study of the particular setting. Although the current study advances research by examining variation at the firm level, further studies can consider multiple 29 SMOs and exploit variation at the SMO level (Pacheco et al. 2014 ) to further advance research in this area. Future research can also address in more detail the tactics that SMOs use to support markets (Weber et al. 2008) or how their relationship with and influence over firms evolves as new industries transition to maturity (Carlos et al. 2014; Grodal 2017 ).
Although we offer more direct evidence of SMOs' influence than prior empirical research on movement-driven markets has, by exploiting data from industry press we only observe prominence-or the level of attention an SMO receives-at the industry level. We find systematic evidence that SMO prominence at the industry level is linked to important variations in firm strategies, and we infer the mechanisms that underlie this effect by exploring the conditions under which firms' expansion strategies are affected (Vancouver and Carlson 2015) . Although the results are consistent with the proposed mechanisms and several robustness tests confirm our theoretical predictions, with our sample of firms from several countries and across more than two decades, it was not possible to obtain data on attention at the firm or decision-maker level. Further research could attempt to offer even more direct evidence of how SMOs are perceived by conducting experiments or case studies to understand where and when decision makers attend to prominent SMOs and how their attention affects the firm's expansion and other strategic decisions.
Finally, this study demonstrates a substantive influence of SMO prominence on firm strategy, suggesting the need for further research to uncover the implications for firm performance (Bartley and Child 2011; King and Soule 2007) . Our finding that some -sticky‖ organizational attributes make firms more or less sensitive to SMOs suggests that social movement influences may account for variation in firms' performance as well. This article offers novel insights into how SMOs supporting an industry can influence firms' strategic choices; the need to understand their impact on firm performance presents an important opportunity for further work. View publication stats View publication stats
